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I The Distinction between Poor and
Ultra-poor
Ultra-poor people are those who live in ultra-poor
households. These are households with so little
income per consumption unit that - if they adopt
spending patterns (both among foods and as between
them and non-foods) typical of their household size,
composition and income - they are in a typical week
able to eat so little food as to be a significant risk of not
meeting their dietary energy requirement. In year-
round or seasonally-spaced surveys, ultra-poor
households, as a proportion of all households in any
group, can be estimated by finding the proportion who
follow the 'two 80 per cent rule': i.e. the proportion
eating below 80 per cent of FAO/WHO (1973) weight-
adjusted dietary energy requirements, despite spending
at least 80 per cent of income on food. Although for
most low-income countries only 2-5 per cent of
persons, in typical surveys not carried out in acute
famines, either suffer from grade III anthropometry or
fall into severely undernourished groups [Bengoa and
Donoso 1974; Keller and Fillmore 1983] - and
although it is only severe undernourishment that is
linked to functional impairment [Lipton 1983] -
many more people are at risk of falling into such
groups if bad life events, years, and/or seasons overlap
or coincide. For most low-income countries, 10-20 per
cent of people appear to fall into these ultra-poor
groups, i.e. to follow the 'two 80 per cent' rule at any
given moment of survey; such people, and especially
their children, would be at quite substantial risk of
descending into the severely undernourished 2-5 per
cent, if their ultra-poverty were long sustained.
There are quite sharp turning points in food behaviour
[Rao 1981; Lipton 1983a, 1985a; Edirisinghe and
Poleman 19831 as between the ultra-poor, who follow
the 'two 80 per cent' rule, and everybody else,
including the moderately poor. Only the ultra-poor
appear to maintain the ratio of food outlay - and
even of outlay on coarse, low-cost energy sources - to
income, when they become a little better off. Also the
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ultra-poor have sharply higher child/adult ratios; and
are especially likely to be landless, or (in semi-arid
areas) to operate below five acres or so. The ultra-poor
also differ in certain labour-market characteristics.
Although, even among the poor, lower income
induces higher participation in work, this does not
work among the ultra-poor, perhaps because they are
too often hungry or ill. Also the ultra-poor, being
more often dependent on casual labour than are other
groups, show higher unemployment - but the places,
years and seasons of substantially higher unemploy-
ment feature only slight reductions in labour supply
(participation), and therefore somewhat lower real
wage-rates [Lipton 1983a, 1983b, 1983c, 1985b].
If the ultra-poor are at much greater risk, especially of
lasting harm to under-fives, from undernutrition -
and if their conditions make a normal response to
investments or incentives, e.g. via raised workforce
participation, specially difficult, and appear to
mandate a 'food first' approach - then the separate
identification of these ultra-poor households is crucial
for the success of targeted policies against poverty.
For example, in Kenya, areas with only slightly above
average incidence of poor people have, much greater
measured severity of poverty [Greer and Thorbecke
1986], probably indicating a much greater proportion
of ultra-poor (among the poor as a whole) than in
other areas. These very poor areas, at least a priori,
appear likely to be risky and unirrigated; the effects of
seasonality, in such areas especially, upon the ultra-
poor therefore merits close attention.
II Seasonal Differentiation
Very interesting inferences are suggested by Dr.
Emmy Simmons's work on three villages in northern
Nigeria [Lipton 1983a:42]. Non-poor households
there show no relationship of calories per consumption
unit to seasonal instability. Those with very low
income per consumption unit - who normally
average below 2,200 kcal per consumption unit per
day over the year - show some tendency to suffer
from greater seasonal variation as average intake
declines. For those who are at slight risk of
undernutrition, with intakes of dietary energy between
2,200 and 2,700 kcal daily, this intake is very weakly
correlated with income per consumption unit; they
also show a strong negative link between low intake
and seasonal instability.
This suggests that the severity of nutrition risk among
the ultra-poor is linked to both hunger and seasonal
instability. However, it also suggests that the apparent
degree and indeed presence of caloric inadequacy
among moderately poor people - who seem at first
glance to have nutritionally borderline intakes of
calories - is really due largely to choices,
corresponding to differences in requirements, rather
than to severe hunger (which one would expect to be
income-linked in its intensity within the group
counted as being at slight risk) or to average year-
round income. The capacity to keep out of ultTa-
poverty may partly depend on adjustment mechanisms
which permit persons within a group, who have
relatively low average of intake to requirements, to
adjust more effectively in seasons when that intake
declines, because of falling intakes, rising requirements
or both. Such adjustment seems to work for the group
of persons at slight risk of undernutrition, but not for
the group at high risk, as the above relationships
indicate. Those at high risk overlap fairly closely, in
these northern Nigerian villages, with those following
the 'two 80 per cent rule'. A related finding in Matlab,
Bangladesh, is that landless mothers showed both
lower average dietary energy intake and greater
seasonal fluctuation than did mothers with land
[Chambers, Longhurst and Pacey 198 1:59].
What of seasonality in labour income, the largest part
of most poor people's incomes? Age- and sex-specific
participation rates, real wage-rates, and unemployment
all tend to fluctuate seasonally, and to do so most
seriously for casual workers, females, and the ultra-
poor. In the Indian National Sample Survey in 1977-
78, adult female participation rates fell nine per cent in
rural areas, but six per cent in urban areas, from the
July-September, 1977, seasonal peak to the April-
June, 1978, trough; adult male rates fell by only
three per cent and one per cent respectively. These
comparative patterns are confirmed by State and
village data, especially for casual workers [Lipton
1983b].
There are interactions between seasonal fluctuations
in participation rates and in employment. The latter
are also worst for the poorest people, since these are
residual workers; in slack seasons, small farmers can
adequately supply their labour requirements with
family workers, and tend to lay off casual (landless)
employees first - especially women - so as to
minimise search and supervision costs of labour.
(Such employees are also likeliest to be under-
nourished, and hence to show low labour-productivity,
in the slack season.) In the 18 poorest households in
four villages in Gujarat, adult-days in the workforce,
as a proportion of all adult-days, fell from 38 per cent
(peak) to 32 per cent (trough); in the best-off eight
households in these villages, all with no participating
female workers, the corresponding proportions of
adult-days remained steady, at 43-45 per cent, from
peak to trough [Lipton 1983b:35]. These patterns are
broadly confirmed in northern Nigerian villages.
The policy implications, in respect of building up
slack-season female employment (for example with
public works schemes), require caution. We find a
serious slow-down in weight gain, among children
aged less than 18 months, in the slack season in Shubh
Kumar's study in Kerala, India - but this slow-down
happens only among children whose mothers are in
the workforce but outside the home enterprise, i.e. the
poorest, who must rely on casual employment rather
than self-employment [Kumar 1977]. Indeed, extra
female income appears to assist slack-season child
nutrition only if earned in the family enterprise
[Kumar 1977:33].
Due to 'disguises' such as slack-season expansion of
cattle care and domestic work, unemployment
fluctuations are understated even in carefully collected
village-level data. However such fluctuations remain
significant, and affect the poorest worst, partly
because - as we have seen - in slack seasons
employees from poor households are 'crowded out' by
the self-employed on small-to-medium family farms.
This also happens in bad years; in the 1974-75
drought, in six villages of Gujarat, there was a fall of
55 per cent in family labour use from the previous
year's level, but of 88 per cent in casual labour [Lipton
1983b:57]. However, generally, slack-season labour
supply (as measured by the workforce participation
rate) falls less than demand (as measured by the
proportion of participants finding employment), so
that real wage-rates fall alongside both (given that the
elasticity of labour supply is not much below that of
labour demand). Casual labourers, the most likely to
be in ultra-poor households, tend to experience most
acutely this seasonal conjunction of low employment,
participation, and wage-rate.
What compensatory seasonal policies might exist?
Irrigation, and seasonal compensatory employment
schemes like Maharashtra's Employment Guarantee
Scheme, often appear to raise employed time most for
women, casual workers, and people from low status-
groups [Lipton 1 983b: 84-5]. Also, price compensation
may be possible. Matlab data show rice prices highest,
and household cereal stocks lowest, when seasonal
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wage-rates and employment are least, and this is
confirmed for Bangladesh [Chambers, Longhurst and
Pacey 198 1:55, 89-90]. Modern varieties of cereals are
often associated with some declines in the seasonal
variability of outputs, because they often do best in
irrigated conditions outside the main (rainy) cropping
season. The resulting price stabilisation across seasons
(which can be supplemented by public food grain
releases in seasons of scarcity, if output growth due to
modern varieties has permitted stockbuilding, as in
India) can reduce seasonal vulnerability for the poor
- which helps them even in parts of the country where
the modern varieties have not prospered, but can be
purchased, at less inflated prices than previously, in
slack seasons or bad years.
III Is Sub-Saharan Africa Different?
SSA generally has more extreme seasonality, but less
inequality among the rural poor, than other
developing areas. Seasonality is generally more
extreme than in Asia in comparable semi-arid tropical
zones, partly because there is less irrigation in SSA,
partly because its porous, sandy soils retain less
moisture. Offsetting this, the tropical rainforests of
SSA may suffer from even less seasonality than
elsewhere, because these are in general less exploited,
at least than their Asian counterparts - and larger
proportions of rural people depend on rainforest
cultivation in Africa than elsewhere; but population
growth and shortening fallows render this compen-
sation less and less important as time goes by.
Everywhere, water control seems to be less in Africa -
below three per cent of crop land is irrigated, as
against over 30 per cent in Asia. Moreover long
distances and bad transport systems impede seasonal
corrections by way of movements of inter-regional
(price-compensating) grain, and even of labour. At
least since 1960, experience suggests that African
climates are less predictable, more prone to greater
harshness in bad years, and more liable to successive
bad years, than Asian climates. All this reinforces the
harm done by a given degree of seasonal instability.
Moreover, in much of SSA, seasonal (and other)
variations impinge more directly on poor people than
is the case in South Asia, because a larger proportion
of poor people retain usufructuary rights over
cultivated land, and fewer have non-agricultural
employment income. Furthermore, tribal tenure
rights deny poor African farmers the 'last resort' of
their Asian counterparts in really bad times, viz.
mortgage. For all these reasons it is not surprising that
African smallholders are much more prone to use
intercropping to reduce risks than are Asian
smallholders, and also to select crops with low
seasonal specificity (roots and tubers in many cases),
or low vulnerability to moisture stress (millet,
sorghum), as compared with their Asian counterparts
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who try to select wheat or rice as main crops, soil and
water permitting.
However, population growth in sub-Saharan Africa
is eroding many of the differences - favourable and
unfavourable - between its regions and similar ones
in Asia. Slash-and-burn cultivation is less and less
possible. A growing proportion of rural people
comprises (a) landless or near-landless labourers,
residual employees if in agriculture and hence
especially vulnerable to seasonal and other fluctuations
in the demand for labour; (b) farmers with individual
claims on land rights, able to sell or mortgage land in
time of stress. Crop-mixes are shifting (with
urbanisation, food aid, and research biases) towards
maize, rice and wheat, with more specific dated water
requirements, and therefore more seasonal vulner-
ability, than the older crops and mixed-cropping
systems.
As Africa's person/land ratio gets closer to Asia's, the
'Africa-damaging' differences in respect of vulner-
ability to seasonal stress should also be reduced. But
the latter reduction requires public spending in
support of the farm sector, in response to the new
factor ratios. Such spending is constrained by urban
bias much more extreme than in Asia; by severe
shortages of funds for recurrent public outlays; and by
foreign and other pressures towards 'price purist',
expenditure-reducing public-sector policies. Hence
there is rather little spending on the water-
management, or even on the improvement of intra-
rural road systems, that might reduce seasonal
vulnerability in Africa.
Bad seasonal impacts on poor people, like other 'agro-
health' issues, urgently need research on how to adapt
responses to rapidly rising person/land ratios. What
are the counter-seasonal options in the context of a
continent-wide shift from area-expanding to yield-
expanding technology? The latter, in South Asia, has
actually increased the coefficient of variation of yearly
food output at national levels, but this is due to the
concentration of (rising) output in a few nearby areas,
dependent partly on irrigation but partly also on
rainfall, and therefore covariant. Increases in fertiliser
use, and most shifts towards modern seed varieties,
increase 'worst-case' output-per-year for any given
farm - even if that rather unimportant number, the
coefficient of variation of national output, goes up.
The damage done by an unexpectedly bad season
should therefore be reduced by this sort of research-
linked intensification. But neither the increases, nor
the improved levels of food reserves associated with a
shift to modern varieties, can be achieved without
substantial spending on agricultural research and on
input supply and delivery, in most areas probably
including at least micro-level irrigation systems.
IV Some Possible Areas of Remedy
I should like to follow up the above remarks with
something which is at best a set of notes towards a
research agenda, that may stimulate others. The
question is: how can one reduce the extent to which
seasonality leads to increases in ultra-poverty? Several
forms of adaptation to seasonal stress, by people
already at risk, are possible.
First, food behaviour could be adapted. In an
unexpectedly bad season, it may become possible for
different groups of poor people to raise their ratios of
consumption to income, of food to consumption, or of
cheap (e.g. reserve-crop root) consumption to food. It
may become possible for the potentially ultra-poor to
escape their fate by adapting the timing of work, or of
meals, or the places of work, to reduce the amount of
calories required and/or to improve the conversion
efficiency of food into work, although experts disagree
about the extent to which individuals differ, over time,
in their metabolic rates per kg - or can adapt their
rates to increase food-to-work conversion efficiency in
times of nutritional stress; how much adaptation is
possible, among whom, for how long, and what
measures might be taken by individuals or societies to
improve benign adaptations to nutritional stress? It
may also be possible to improve the intra-family food
distribution in times of seasonal stress. Some of these
strategies are doubtless adopted by poor people
seeking to cope with bad seasons, but not all people
adopt the best strategies in each bad season; perhaps
some can learn from others, or can be helped by
outside systems to do so.
Second, households in seasonal stress may be able to
respond by adapting their use of factor inputs. Work
timing, duration, type, or search behaviour may be
adaptable between peak and slack seasons, or among
household members in seasons of nutritional stress. If
assets are owned, it may be possible at some cost to
shift probable income from assets into the more
stressful, or less secure, part of the year. Plainly, in
environments where there are no major long-term
trends of change, poor households are likely to learn
such adaptive techniques by themselves - they must,
to survive. But few environments are as static as this,
and indeed policy itself does much to change them,
often in ways that destroy traditionally learned
methods of seasonal coping. Also, many of the poorest
children do not at present survive seasonal stress; and
many of the more adaptable adults either migrate or
enrich themselves enough to reduce its impact, leaving
the burdens to fall on those who remain in the
potentially ultra-poor groups.
A third possible area of adaptation concerns seasonal
migration. Often, seasonal migrants are the poorest
and most oppressed of groups. Yet anti-poverty policy
has seldom made effective contact with them. Further,
Indian experience suggests that seasonal migration is a
major outlet for people - e.g. landless or near-
landless labourers moving from Bihar to the Punjab
for work - who would otherwise be much poorer;
policies that subsidised or otherwise encouraged
migration of labour, instead of mechanisation to
displace labour, could have major beneficial seasonal
effects. Problems of schooling and health for children,
whether they accompany the seasonal migrants or are
left behind, need careful attention, however.
Fourth, it would be worth looking at the possibility of
adapting methods of seasonal financial-cum-land
management. When a really bad year comes along, in
the most difficult seasons, many people are pushed
over into ultra-poverty by being compelled to sell or
mortgage the little land they have. Can alternative and
less onerous methods, at least providing some effective
competition against the small number of local
moneylenders, be found in such circumstances?
Finally, it would be worth asking whether common
property resources, such as access to grazing, water,
thatch grass and fuels, are - or can be rendered - less
'seasonal' than private property resources. Work done
by Jodha in Rajasthan confirms that common
property resources are a much larger part of income
for the very poor than for the better-off - but that
income from common property has been eroding
rapidly in the last 15 years or so [Jodha 1983]. The
analysis of common property management and
protection is among the many parts of our subject that
needs to take on a seasonal tinge, if the access of very
poor people to basic food requirements in difficult
times is to be safeguarded and improved.
These are admittedly scrappy 'thoughts of a dry brain
in a dry season'. Perhaps there is an analogy between
seasonal studies and women's studies. In both cases
the impact and effectiveness of social scientists will be
greatly reduced, if we make a little ghetto for seasonal
studies or women's studies. In the case of seasons, our
entire analysis of the economics, sociology and politics
of agriculture and the rural economy - and of its
relations with the city, about which I have said almost
nothing here - needs to be permeated with an
awareness that impact on the very poor matters most
in the seasons of greatest risk, and is somewhat less
important in the more well-favoured times of the year.
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